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INTRODUCTION

The topic of the balance between public and private interests in land is
one of growing importance and increasing controversy. The environmental
movement of the last three decades has generated significant and varied
government regulation, much of it placing restrictions on the use of privately
owned land. In turn, the past few years have seen a growing property rights
movement, largely in response to such regulation.' The interplay between
private and public interests affects all types of land ownership and property
uses, but is perhaps most pronounced with regard to environmentally sensitive
land. 2 Effective protection of such property often requires that it be left in its
natural state, thus minimizing development opportunities. This raises an
increasingly critical question in our society: what rights do private property
owners have in privately owned land and what rights should the public have
in the same resource.
*
This article is based upon a presentation at the 1998 Michigan State University
Land Use Forum, held in East Lansing, Michigan on January 14, 1998.
**
Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.S., Portland State
University; J.D., Willamette University; J.S.M., Stanford University.
I. For commentary on the property rights movement, see Carol M. Rose, A Dozen
Propositionson Private Property,Public Rights and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH.
& LEE L.REv. 265 (1996); Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and
Private Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1 (1996); see also, Marianne Lavelle, The "Property Rights"
Revolt, NAT'L L.J. May 10, 1993 at 1, 34.
2. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 78 (1995) (describing ecologically sensitive lands "such as wetlands, barrier islands,
riparian corridors, endangered wildlife habitats and the like").
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In addressing this topic this article will do three things. Part One will
first present a thumbnail sketch of the current balance of public and private
rights as reflected in constitutional law, commonly known as the "takings"
issue. Although this is by no means the only manner in which the law
balances public and private interests in property, federal constitutional
protections are commonly viewed as providing the bedrock balance of
interests and will be the focus of Part One of this article. As it will indicate,
this balance leans heavily towards the private side concerning the right to
possess property and exclude others, as well as protecting against state
interference with current uses. However, the balance shifts significantly
toward the public side when the issue is restricting use of undeveloped
property and restricting future uses.
Part Two of this article will then present what I consider to be the bigpicture rationale for striking the balance in this way, which is that property is
a social construct designed to serve social as well as individual purposes.
Such a perspective is well-established in our legal tradition and best explains
historical and legal views of property ownership. As such, private property
rights have always been viewed as being subject to broader public interests,
and private interests must end when they inflict harm on the broader public.
Importantly, this accommodation between private and public interests is an
inherent limitation in the bundle of property rights, rather than a deprivation
of preexisting rights.
Finally, Part Three of this article will discuss whether recognizing a
strong public or social interest in privately owned land is fundamentally unfair
to private landowners, especially when the effect is to substantially lower
property values. Although in some instances government regulation might
result in unfairness, as a general matter there are three reasons why
recognizing a social obligation in private property is not unfair even when
regulation diminishes property value. First, any reasonable investment
expectations regarding future uses of undeveloped land should include the
possibility of regulation to protect public interests. Second, much of the value
in private property has been added by government "givings" in the first
instance, and it cannot be viewed as unfair when government regulations for
important purposes diminish some of that same value. Third, fairness
concerns must also be evaluated from a broader perspective of "reciprocity,"
which recognizes that although a landowner might be adversely affected by
some regulatory actions, the same person is often benefitted by other
regulatory actions, and that overall a general adjustment of benefits and
burdens occurs.
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I. THE CURRENT PUBLIC/PRIVATE BALANCE IN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

In examining the balance between public and private rights in privately
owned property, one can envision two possible extremes. On the one hand,
private property rights might be viewed as absolute, with no limits on how
property might be used. At the other extreme, property ownership could be
viewed as being held completely at the will of the state with no truly private
interests in land; rather, property would be subject to complete revocation by
the state.
Although there are proponents for both of these positions, the American
system has not adopted either one of these extremes. Rather, it has long
recognized that property ownership has both a public and a private dimension
to it. By this, I simply mean that both the public and private landowner have
legitimate interests in property use, and our legal system seeks to
accommodate both within reason.
This balance is reflected in a number of legal norms, but is perhaps best
evidenced in the current United States Supreme Court takings jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence provides the bedrock foundation for protection of private
property interests, and might well be viewed as representing the current
balance of private and public interests in private property. The takings clause
does not, of course, prevent the government from taking property for public
use, but rather qualifies that right in one essential way: just compensation
must be paid.3 As a practical matter, therefore, current takings jurisprudence
delineates when government regulation requires compensation and when it
does not.
Commentators frequently note that the current state of takings law is
quite confusing and vague.4 This article will not attempt a comprehensive
review or analysis of takings doctrine, which has often been done elsewhere. 5

3. The Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause states that "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." See U.S. CONST. amend V. As noted in a
leading property text, it is "beyond dispute" that this provides government with the power of
eminent domain. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMEs E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1141 (3d ed. 1993).
4. See, e.g., J.Peter Byrne, Ten Argumentsfor the Abolition ofthe Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102 (1995) ("an unworkable muddle"); Lynda J. Oswald,
Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in

Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L.REv. 91, 92 (1995) ("[r]egulatory takings are proving to be one
of the enduring legal dilemmas of the twentieth century"); Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L.REv. 1301, 1303-04 (1989) ("doctrinal
and conceptual disarray").
5. See, e.g., Oswald, supra note 4; Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structureof Takings Law,
64 S. CAL. L.REV. 1393 (1991); Peterson, supra note 4; William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins
and OriginalSignificance of the Just CompensationClause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
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Rather, it will simply outline the basic parameters of the current law and how
it relates to respective private and public interests in land.
The bedrock of modern takings jurisprudence is the seminal decision of
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,6 where the Supreme Court first
recognized that the mere regulation of property for legitimate purposes might
constitute a taking if its economic impact is too severe. In that case, the Court
reviewed a state statute which prohibited the mining of coal when subsidence
damage would result, effectively requiring coal companies to keep a portion
of coal in the ground. 7 The Court announced the general principle that
although government need not pay compensation every time regulations
reduce property values,8 if a regulation "goes too far" it would be considered
a taking. 9 Although PennsylvaniaCoal established the basic principle that
regulatory takings occur when government regulation "goes too far," the Court
gave little guidance as to when that point is reached," noting only that at
bottom the question is one of fairness."
In subsequent years the Supreme Court has typically addressed the issue
of regulatory takings in an ad hoc manner, looking at a number of factors to
see if the regulation has "gone too far." This is clearly seen in a more recent
and significant decision, Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. New York City. 2
In that case, the Court emphasized that its takings analysis involved
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" rather than any set formula. 3 The Court
then proceeded to identify several factors relevant in a takings analysis, which
might loosely be called the Penn Centralfactors. Primary among them are the
nature of the regulation, the purposes it serves, and the interference with
investment-backed expectations. 4 Applying these factors the Court said that

L.J. 694 (1985). Two older and very influential articles are Frank 1. Michelman, Property,
Utility, andFairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "JustCompensation" Law, 80
HARV. L.REv. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964).
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
8. The Court stated that government could not go on if it had to pay every time its
regulations adversely affected land values, and thus some diminution in value had to be accepted
by landowners. See id. at 413.
9. See id at 415.
10. The Court in Pennsylvania Coalwas not entirely clear why it thought the regulation
had gone too far so as to be a taking, and the Court's analysis is subject to several
interpretations. One significant factor, however, was that the effect of the statute was to make
the mining of anthracite coal "commercially impracticable." Id. at 414.
11. Seeid at416.
12. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
14. See id.
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New York City's Landmark Preservation Law did not constitute a taking as
applied to the plaintiffs land, in particular emphasizing that it did not
interfere with any current uses of the property and allowed a reasonable
return. 15
The Court's most recent regulatory takings decision is Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council,'6 where it brought some analytical clarity, albeit
limited, to the takings issue. In that case the Court reviewed a state statute
which had the effect of prohibiting any development on two beachfront lots
purchased by the plaintiff for residential construction. 7 The Court began its
analysis by noting that it had generally avoided any "set formula" in deciding
taking cases, instead engaging in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' 8 It
noted, however, that it had previously identified two types of categorical
takings, which are instances where, if certain facts are established, it will be
deemed a taking and just compensation required. 9 First, the Court recognized
that any permanent physical invasion or occupation of private land, no matter
how minimal, constitutes a taking and must be compensated. 20 This includes
not only efforts to take title to property, but also any attempt by government
itself to intrude on land or permit third parties to intrude on land.2 The Court
viewed the ability to exclude others to be at the core of land ownership and
thus even minimal occupations require compensation,2 2 reiterating a sentiment
expressed in a number of other cases.23 Thus, at least with regard to the

15. See id. at 136.
16. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
17. The plaintiff had in fact purchased the two lots for a total of almost one million
dollars, at a time when construction of single family homes was permitted under applicable law.
Subsequent to the purchase a law was passed designating the plaintiff's property as a critical
area and precluded any development, forcing the plaintiff to keep the land in its natural state.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.
18. Id. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Previous Supreme Court cases had found takings based upon a physical invasion
when the government itself had physically invaded property interests. See, e.g., United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (physical invasion of airspace). Takings have also been found
where the government required landowners to permit third parties on the property. See, e.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (law requiring landlords
to allow cable companies to place cables on neutral properties).
22. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
23. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831(1987); Lorretto,
458 U.S. at 419; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The Court has recently
again emphasized in a post-Lucas decision that the right to exclude is a particularly significant
attribute of property ownership and even minimal interferences with it constitute takings. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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possession of land, Lucas struck the balance heavily toward the private
24
dimension of land ownership, suggesting it reaches near absolute status.
The second type of categorical taking recognized in Lucas concerned
regulatory takings. In such situations the Court said a categorical taking
occurs when the regulation leaves no economic viability.25 This standard had
in fact been stated as dictum in a number of earlier decisions, 26 although the
Court had never actually found a taking on that ground. In stating this
standard in Lucas, the Court did not give much guidance on how to assess
economic viability, since it relied on a trial court finding that the regulation
made the property "valueless. 2 7 It suggested in dictum, however, that the
most obvious instance of no economic viability is where property, in its
totality, must be left in a natural or undeveloped state.28
Although the Court in Lucas recognized that a categorical taking occurs
when regulation results in no economic viability, it importantly did not limit
regulatory takings to only those situations. Rather, it affirmed that even when
property retains some economic viability there might be a taking under the ad
hoc balancing test previously recognized in Penn Central.29 Under that test
a court will balance several factors, most notably the degree of interference
with distinct, investment-backed expectations and the particular purpose
behind the regulation to determine whether a regulation has gone too far and
should be considered a taking.3"
As a practical matter, this ad hoc balancing test will rarely result in a
taking when there is some economic viability and no interference with existing
uses. Thus, in a typical scenario where development restrictions are placed
on environmentally sensitive land, a taking will usually not be found as long
as some economic viability remains on the property, even when there is
substantial diminution in value. 3 However, the focus on interference with

24. The Court has not explained the reasons for this, but it parallels the common law's
similar emphasis on a landowner's right to exclude others from the property. A right to exclude
is, of course, necessary to encourage investments in property. Perhaps more relevant is the
important role the right to exclude plays in providing an area of autonomy for individuals vis-avis the state and other people. See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
25. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
26. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
28. See id. at 1018.
29. See id. at 1019 n.8.
30. See id.
31. See Eric T. Freyfogle, supra note, 2 at 87-88 (noting that courts will permit
restrictions on wetlands development, even where diminution in value exceeds fifty percent, as
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investment-backed expectations arguably becomes quite important if
government attempts to restrict current uses, which likely reflect substantial
investment dollars.32 Absent a nuisance,33 any such interference with current
uses on developed property might well result in a taking unless a reasonable
time period is given to amortize the use.34 As a practical matter, the Court has
not needed to speak directly on the issue, since government almost always
grants nonconforming status to existing property uses, recognizing the need
to protect such investments.35 It is important to emphasize, however, that
current takings analysis is generally protective of private interests involving
current uses of property; 36 it leans to the public side of the equation only when
future uses are the issue.
The current private/public balance as reflected in the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence might be summarized in the following manner. With
regard to a landowner's right of possession and right to exclude others, the
current balance weighs very heavily in favor of the private interests. With
regard to restrictions on current uses of land, the law is less developed, though
the Court's emphasis on investment-backed expectations strongly suggests it
again weighs toward the private interests. It is only in the instance of potential
uses, often on undeveloped land, that the balance generally weighs more

long as some economic viability remains).
32. The Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central, where the Court first clearly
articulated the "interference with investment-backed expectations" standard, emphasized that
existing uses were not interfered with in concluding there was no taking. See Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 136. Although not directly addressing the issue, the Court seemed to strongly suggest
that the taking argument becomes much more significant when current uses are restricted.
33. The Court has indicated in several cases that if government regulation is aimed at
preventing a nuisance it will not be a taking, even if it restricts existing uses reflecting
substantial development costs. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (city
prohibition of operation of a brickyard in residential area not a taking, even though reduced
value from $800,000 to $60,000); see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(restricting operation of a quarry in residential area not a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928) (state order to destroy diseased trees not a taking). The reason that interference with
such existing uses is not a taking, even when substantial diminution in value might result, is that
nuisance-causing uses were never part of the landowner's title to begin with. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1029-31.
34. The fact that takings law generally protects investments in existing uses has been
frequently noted by commentators. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 1, at 285-86; John A. Humbach,
Law anda New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REv. 339 (1989).
35. See 4 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 51.01 [2] [a], at 51-5 (Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., ed. 1997) (law generally
recognizes a vested right to continue nonconforming uses).
36. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 134 ("[i]n the law of takings, a considerable
difference exists between a regulation that interferes with a current land use and one that bans
a prospective land use.")

Law Review

[3:681

heavily toward the public side of the equation. 7 In such instances the state
can place substantial restrictions on future uses without paying compensation
as long as some economic viability remains. This in effect recognizes a strong
public or social dimension to the property. The next part of this article will
address why the balance should weigh so heavily toward the public side in
cases of undeveloped land uses, especially with regard to environmentally
sensitive land.

II. PROPERTY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
Private land ownership in our country has long been viewed as involving
both private and public dimensions. On the one hand, protection of private
interests in land is critical to efficient uses of resources and incentives to
development.38 Without "reasonably secure expectations of continued
ownership '39 there would be little reason to improve resources and property.
Such improvement and development activity is critical to the provision of
essential services and goods, such as housing. Moreover, private property is
necessary for personal autonomy and privacy.4" Thus, the law historically has
and continues to protect private interest in land ownership.
At the same time, the law has also recognized a strong social dimension
to property ownership. This recognition of a strong public interest in privately
owned land is not a recent invention of the Supreme Court, but rather traces
its origins back to the beginning of our country and is a consistent theme in
property law. 4 It is clearly seen in the sic utere principle of nuisance law,

37. For a strong argument that the takings clause does not and should not require
compensation for interference with future or potential uses of property, see Humbach, supra
note 34, at 365-69.
38. See Rose, supra note 1,at 267-68.
39. See id. at 268; see also, Humbach, supranote 34, at 347 ("[p]eople more likely will
sow when they are assured that they can reap and enjoy the fruits of their efforts").
40. The privacy and autonomy serving function of private property has been frequently
noted by both courts and commentators. The Supreme Court strongly stated Zhis position in
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980):
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can
repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual "to be
let alone" in the privacy of the home, "sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the
weary, and the sick." The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.
Id. at 471 (citations omitted).
41. A number of commentators have discussed the long-standing recognition of a strong
public interest in privately owned land and how it is firmly established in the English and
American legal traditions. For a recent and particularly excellent discussion of the topic, see
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which states that a person cannot use his or her property in such as way as to
harm the property rights of another.4 2 More significantly, the recognition of
a strong public interest in privately owned property has also been long
recognized with regard to public restrictions on land use. Early America often
regulated property use for the public good,43 including various restrictions on
perceived noxious activity" and even restrictions on what crops could be
grown.45 Moreover, courts have long held that government can place
reasonable restrictions on land use for the public good.46 This includes not
only restrictions on existing land uses that create a nuisance, but restrictions
on future development that might interfere with broader public interests.
This long-standing recognition that use of private property is subject to
broader social concerns has often been referred to as the social function of
property.47 It reflects the fundamental concept that property is a social
construct whereby society creates and maintains property rights in the first
instance."' For this reason inherent in the state's creation of property is its
ability to limit the extent of property interests for broader social purposes.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that property would not exist without the

Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for
Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVT. L. 1095 (1996); see also Rose,
supra note 1, at 274-82.
42. "Sic utere" is short for "sic utere tuo alienum non laedas, meaning, in essence, that
every person should so use his own property as not to injure that of another." See Morgan v.
High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); see also, Freyfogle supranote 2 at 100-01
(discussing evolution of sic utere principle in Anglo/American law and noting how it illustrates
the inherent ambiguity of absolute ownership).
43. See generally Duncan, supra note 41, at 1133-37. See also, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992). (Blackman, J., dissenting).
44. See Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principlesor Politics, 34 BuFF. L. REV.
735, 751-52 (1985).
45. See Duncan, supra note 41, at 1135 (discussing restrictions during colonial period
on what crops could be grown).
46. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the
community"); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851); Commonwealth
v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (1 I Met.) 55 (1846); see generally Duncan, supranote 41, at 1142-54.
47. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the social function of
property).
48. Commentators have often noted that property is a social creation of the state. See,
e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Endof EnvironmentalLaw? LibertarianProperty,NaturalLaw,
and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 182 (1995);
Humbach, supra note 33, at 344-45.
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state and it is thus subject to certain implied limitations.49 Primary among
them is that property may not be used in a manner that harms the public."
Construing property interests in this manner implicitly recognizes that the
use of property inevitably extends beyond land boundaries and will often
conflict with other social needs, necessitating a reasonable accommodation.
Although fairness and the need to encourage investment in property requires
protection of private interests in many instances, it is reasonable to view those
private interests as ending when they inflict harm on the broader public.
Importantly, accommodation between private and public interests is an
inherent limitation in the bundle of property interests, rather than a deprivation
of any rights.
That this is an inherent limitation of property ownership, rather than a
deprivation of preexisting rights, is seen in a number of early judicial
decisions. When reviewing restrictions on land use to serve social purposes,
courts not only usually upheld such restrictions, but consistently viewed such
limitations as being inherent in the property to begin with. For example, as
long ago as 1846, in Commonwealth v. Tewksbury," the Massachusetts
Supreme Court upheld a statute which had the effect of prohibiting owners of
private beaches from removing any sand or stones. In recognizing a public
interest sufficient to limit use of even private beaches, the court stated "[a]ll
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be used
as to injure the equal rights of others, or to destroy or greatly impair the public
rights and interests of the community." 2
This sentiment was expressed in a number of other early cases where
private land use conflicted with public interests, typically with shared
resources such as air and water. 3 Courts consistently recognized that private
interests were not absolute and must yield to public interests when conflicts
arise. This recognition of inherent limits on private property interests is
similarly seen in the widespread growth and acceptance of land use
restrictions in the early part of this century. In recognizing the validity of such
restrictions courts recognized that property rights are not absolute but
necessarily limited by the broader good.54 The Supreme Court itself

49. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (R. Hildreth trans., Trubner
1864) ("[blefore laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.").
50. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665; Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (II Met.) at 57.
51. See Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (I I Met.) at 55.
52. Id. at 57. For an excellent discussion of Tewksbury and other early cases, see
Duncan, supra note 41, at 1147-52.
53. See generally Rose, supra note 1, at 270-72.
54. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Freyfogle,
supra note 2, at 104-05; Humbach, supra note 34, at 341.
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recognized this principle in a number of decisions during this5 period,
frequently stating that property use was limited by public interests.
The inherent social obligation of private property is most apparent with
restrictions on how property is used. Although less likely to arise, a social
function of property has even been applied to place limits on the right to
exclude, typically considered at the heart of property ownership. As recently
indicated by Joseph Singer, at common law, owners of inns and similar
accommodations were often required to serve all who came and could not
refuse service. 6 This clearly limited the normal right to exclude, indicating
a social obligation attached to such property. This same concept was seen
more recently in the well-known decision of State v. Shack," where the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that the right to exclude did not extend to
prohibiting access to migrant workers on private lands, stating that "[p]roperty
rights serve human values."5 8 Thus, even core property interests such as the
right to exclude are implicitly subject to a social obligation in appropriate
circumstances. 9

55. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("[a]s long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power"); Hadecheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 349, 410 (1915) (private property interests must at
times "yield to the good of the community"); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665 ("all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community").
56. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283 (1996).
57. 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
58. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372.
59. Although the right to exclude is subject to a social obligation in appropriate
situations, it is less likely to occur than with restrictions on the use of property. This is both
because the right to exclude is such an important attribute of property, and because its exercise
is less likely to interfere with social concerns. Thus, the private interest tends to be weighty, and
the public interest minimal, in most instances where the right to exclude is at issue. Where
autonomy and privacy interests are more minimal, such as with private property which is open
to the public, competing social concerns, if strong enough, might outweigh the right to exclude.
One area in which this issue has frequently arisen is with regard to exercising speech on
privately owned shopping center property. The United States Supreme Court has held there is
no First Amendment right to exercise speech on shopping center property, in effect stating that
a private property owner's right to exclude outweighs any First Amendment rights. See
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507(1976). State courts that have addressed the issue under their
own constitutions have split on whether the exercise of state free speech rights outweighs a
shopping center owner's right to exclude. Compare, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469
A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984) (rejecting free speech right in shopping center), with Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (recognizing
such a right under the California Constitution).
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Although the principle that private land is subject to broader social
purposes is firmly established in our law, what those purposes are and how
they should be balanced against private interests depends on a particular
context and is subject to change as social conditions change. To go back to
the example of nuisance law, courts have never drawn a clear set of lines
outlining what is and what is not a nuisance. Rather, the law has adopted a
reasonableness balancing test in which a number of factors are considered in
determining whether a particular land use is a nuisance.6" Thus, the same
activity might be considered a nuisance in one instance but not in another.
More particularly, what activities are considered nuisances is subject to
change as societal conditions and values evolve,6 1 so, land uses that might
have been considered completely acceptable and desirable a century ago might
be considered detrimental and nuisances today.
Similarly, the broader social dimension of property must also be
determined according to evolving social conditions.62 For much of our
nation's history there was a societal priority on land development and capture
of natural resources.63 Even here, shared resources such as air and water
might require special restrictions. For the most part however, there was little
perceived conflict between private and public interests in land; the public or
social interest was largely maximized by private interests and development.
In more recent times there has been increasing awareness of the concerns
about development. This is particularly true as certain resources, such as open
space and wetlands, become increasingly scarce and the supply of land
becomes more limited. We have also become more sensitized to the
environmental importance of certain land, such as wetlands, coastal zones, and
wildlife habitats, and how they serve the public good in previously unforeseen
ways. Though land development certainly continues to be an important goal,

60. The law of nuisance prohibits substantial and unreasonable interference with the
land of another. Thus, only those substantial interferences which are deemed unreasonable are
considered nuisances. Reasonableness is determined by examining a number of factors,
including the gravity of the harm, the extent of the harm, the social value of the respective uses,
the suitability of the respective uses to the locale in question, and the ability of either party of
avoiding the harm. See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS §§826-828. See also, DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 3, at 959-61.
61. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 100-02 (discussing changing nature of nuisance law
as societal conditions change); Rose, supra note I at 273 ("[i]ncreasing congestion in common
resources is a major reason for the evolution of legal definitions of property rights").
62. See Rose, supranote 1,at 274-82 (discussing the evolving nature of public interests
in land).
63. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 95-97 (discussing America's early "frontier ethic"
which. "[because of its vastness and plentitude .... encouraged a consumptive, aggrandizing
culture"); see also Humbach, supra note 34, at 339-40.
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closely tied to societal needs such as housing, it must be more carefully
balanced against the need to preserve environmentally sensitive land.
Efforts in recent years at protecting such environmentally sensitive land
have made the tension between the public and private dimensions of property
ownership more pronounced. There is little doubt that a strong public interest
exists in preserving areas such as wetlands, open space, and coastal zones, and
for that reason they are viewed as subject to a social obligation because of the
harm development would do. However, unlike typical zoning regulations
which permit some development, regulations on wetlands and similar property
typically prohibit development altogether, at least on a portion ofthe property.
This will often result in a substantial diminution in value.
Property rights proponents have in turn questioned the fairness of
recognizing a social obligation on the owners of such properties when such an
obligation results in substantial losses in land value.' 4 Although generally not
questioning the ability of government to regulate environmentally sensitive
land for the public interest, property rights proponents have argued that
fairness requires that loss in value be placed on the public through
compensation requirements.65 In essence they suggest that such regulations
extend beyond what can be legitimately considered a public interest in such
property and reach the private dimension of ownership, for which
compensation should be given.

64. See Michael M. Berger, Dollarsand Damages:A Debate: Yes! It's the FairThing
to Do, PLANNING, Mar. 1996, at 22; Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights
Initiatives as a Response to "Environmental Takings", 46 S.C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1995).
65. There has been a significant property rights movement in the United States over the
last decade. A prominent agenda item has been the attempted reshaping of takings analysis
through proposed federal and state legislation. To date most enacted legislation has simply
required state government and agencies to engage in "taking assessments" to determine whether
their actions constitute takings under applicable judicial standards. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §678003 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-704; TENN. CODE ANN. §12-1-203 (Supp. 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. §63-90-4 (Supp. 1998). However, a number of states have considered, and several
have passed, legislation that would require compensation when diminution in value from
government action or regulation reaches a certain point, such as fifty percent. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§3: 3601-42 (West Supp. 1999) (compensation required for losses of twenty
percent or more; applies only to agricultural and forestland); MISS. CODE ANN. § §49-33-I to 4933-19 (Supp. 1998) (compensation required for diminution in value of forty percent or more;
applies only to agricultural and forestland); TEX. GOV'T CODE §2007.041 (West Supp. 1998)
(compensation required for diminution in value of twenty-five percent or more; applies to all
land). For a discussion of proposed and enacted state takings legislation, see Mark W. Cordes,
Leapfroggingthe Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation,24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187
(1997). For an assessment of proposed federal legislation, see Frank 1.Michelman, A Skeptical
View of "PropertyRights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (1995).
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The short answer, of course, is that in some instances fairness would
dictate payment of compensation. As a general matter, however, courts and
government have viewed such property as subject to a strong public interest
that permits government to restrict the property without compensation. The
next part of this article will briefly review the fairness argument and suggest
three reasons why in most cases fairness concerns do not require
compensation.
III. FAIRNESS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN LAND
The issue of fairness in land use regulation in general, and restrictions on
environmentally sensitive land in particular, is a very important one. The
Supreme Court itself has suggested that its own takings analysis is essentially
about fairness in terms of who should bear the cost of regulation. In the
seminal regulatory takings case of PennsylvaniaCoal, the Court stated that "a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change."' In more recent years, the Court has often stated that the takings
clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."6 7

Thus, fairness is at the heart of the takings analysis and the fairness issue
is this: when should the cost of regulation fall on the government (by
requiring compensation) and when should it fall on the landowner (with no
compensation). It should be pointed out, of course, that current takings
analysis will in some instances deem the impact of regulation so severe as to
require compensation. This might likely be the case where the landowner's
entire property is required to be left in its natural state leaving no economic
viability.6" In such situations a taking will likely be found requiring
compensation.
In many instances, however, restrictions on environmentally sensitive
land will result in a substantial economic impact but permit some economic
viability. This might well be the case where a significant portion of the
property-say 50% to 70%--must be left in its natural state, but the remaining
portion can be developed. The Court has made it clear that in such situations
the economic impact must be evaluated on the tract as a whole rather than

66. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
67. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also, Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong).
68. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
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simply focusing on the regulated portion.69 Viewed in this manner there might
well be a significant diminution in value, but the property will still retain
enough economic viability so as to avoid a taking.7"
Although takings jurisprudence likely does not mandate compensation
in such situations, the issue of fairness remains. In particular, is it fair to have
individual landowners bear a substantial diminution in value in order to
preserve broader public benefits?
As always, the answer to that question largely turns on the particular
facts of any given situation. As a general matter, however, there are several
significant reasons to suggest that it is not typically unfair to place such
diminutions in value on affected property owners. The initial reason is simply
to reiterate what was said in the previous section-that such property is
inherently limited by broader social concerns to begin with. Thus, when land
use is restricted to serve public interests, nothing is being taken from the
landowner. Rather, an inherent limitation on the property is simply being
recognized, which results in lost value only because of landowner speculation
on what might have happened.7
In addition to this basic rationale, three additional reasons exist for
suggesting that fairness does not necessarily require compensation when
landowners suffer economic loss due to government regulation of
environmentally sensitive land.
A. The Problem of Landowner Expectations
An initial and understandable issue concerning the fairness of restrictions
is potential interference with landowner expectations in their property,
especially when restrictions imposed after the land's purchase result in a
substantial loss in value. It is often asserted that fairness dictates that when
land use restrictions substantially diminish land values property owners should
be compensated because of the interference with their expectations when the
land was bought.

69. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497-99 (1987)
(in analyzing economic impact of coal mining regulation as possible taking, affected property
is not to be segmented but treated as a whole); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (takings
jurisprudence analyzes economic impact on parcel as whole, not as divided into discrete
segments); see also, Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993) (same). A number of commentators have similarly noted that
the property should be viewed as a whole and not divided into discrete segments when analyzing
whether a taking has occurred. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 48, at 184-85.
70. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 87-88 (noting courts often sustain regulations on
wetlands where diminution in value exceeds fifty percent).
71. See Humbach, supra note 34, at 365-69.
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Certainly protecting reasonable expectations in property is important, but
such expectations are themselves necessarily shaped by legal rules
surrounding property and in particular the possibility of regulation. As
frequently noted by both courts and commentators, to the extent that people
expect that property might be subject to broader public interests-and that
certainly must be the expectation today-then reasonable expectations must
take into account the possibility of regulation.72 Even such an ardent property
rights advocate as Justice Scalia noted in the Supreme Court's Lucas decision
that "[it] seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of
his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers."73
Land use regulation, therefore, must be viewed as "part of [the]
background risk and opportunity, against which we all take our chances [as
investors in land]." 74 When a person purchases undeveloped land, there must
be the expectation that it might be subject to regulation and that should be
factored into the decision, helping shape the reasonableness of expectations.
Indeed, the possibility of regulation should also be factored into the market
value of the property when purchased.
This is not to say that all state interference with land investment can be
readily dismissed on the basis that property owners should have had the
foresight that regulation might occur. The Supreme Court itself has stated as
part of its takings analysis that even where regulated property retains some
economic viability the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations might be so great so as to constitute a taking.75 The protection
of land investment is most reasonably expected, however, when based upon
actual development expenditures rather than speculation on future uses.
Where a landowner has actually spent money developing land, there is a
strong public policy that the landowner can reasonably expect the investment
is protected; otherwise incentives for the development of land, critical to our

72. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Michelman, supra note 65, at 415; Humbach,
supra note 34, at 367-68; Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings
Law, 27 URB. L.J. 215, 226 (1995); Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 130.

73. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. The Supreme Court has also noted in several other
regulatory contexts that market participants should reasonably expect new restrictions. See
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) ("[t]hose who do business
in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end") (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc. 358 U.S. 84,
91(1958)).
74. Michelman, supra note 65, at 415.
75. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 214. The Court in Lucas made clear that the degree
of interference with investment-backed expectations might be so great as to constitute a taking
even when the property retains some economic viability. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
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economic well-being, are jeopardized. For that reason the law generally, and
takings analysis specifically, provides significant
protection for such
76
expectations, absent a nuisance-like activity.
But where the investment is merely the purchase of land for future
development the case is less compelling. In that instance the investment does
not reflect actual improvement to the property but rather speculation on what
might take place. Since what is being lost are simply possible future uses,
which involve interests never guaranteed under our legal system, expectations
must be viewed as contingent at best. And, as emphasized above, reasonable
expectations must recognize the possibility of regulation to serve public
interests, and must necessarily reflect that risk in investment decisions.77
B. Accounting for Givings as well as Takings
A second reason why it is not necessarily unfair to restrict private
property to serve public interests, even when it results in a substantial loss in
value, is that much of that value was the result of public, as opposed to
private, activity to begin with. This is often known as the "givings" argument,
to highlight the fact that government often gives significant value to land as
well as takes it away.78 As such, the extent of true loss is often far less than
it might appear to be, lessening fairness concerns.
A focus on givings responds to the common misconception that land
values are the result of private efforts, which of course is not the case. Rather,
land values reflect a number of factors, a major one of which is public
investment.
Government actions frequently add value to land in numerous ways,
including such basic subsidies as interest deductions on mortgage payment,
which indirectly increases land values. Two of the most obvious types of
givings in the context of land, however, are infrastructure development and
land use restrictions. Almost any infrastructure support, such as sewer lines
and public facilities, adds significant value to land by making necessary
services accessible to the property. Although property owners today often pay
for some infrastructure through exactions, such exactions reflect the cost of

76. See 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 35, § 51.01[2][a], at 51-5 (law generally recognizes
a vested right to continue nonconforming uses).
77. For a particularly good analysis of why reasonable investment-backed expectations
include the possibility of regulation, see Humbach, supra note 34, at 365-69.
78.

See Donald L. Elliot, Givings and Takings, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan. 1996

3; LAWRENCE W. LIBBY, PROPERTY RIGHTS-THE
USE FORUM CONF., Jan. 9-10, 1996, at 93, 98.
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the infrastructure and not the value it adds to the property.79 More
significantly, exactions do not attempt to recover the broader infrastructure
support, such as roads, which makes land developable, and without which,
commercial value would often be negligible.
The potential impact of government givings on land values can be
illustrated by a simple example. Assume a property owner has a tract of
remote land worth $10,000. The government then puts in a major highway
near the property, creating new commercial opportunities and raising the total
value to $60,000 over several years. A short time later, the government
imposes an environmental restriction on the property, decreasing its value to
$30,000. Although it might initially appear that the government actions
diminished property values by 50% in this example, in fact the cumulative
effect was to increase value by threefold."0
Most real-life examples are not this clearly presented, but the basic point
it represents has substantial validity: that government actions account for a
substantial part of any land value. Although recognition of a strong public
interest in privately owned land is not dependent on such "giving," it helps
reinforce the notion of a public interest. Importantly, it also demonstrates that
diminution in value resulting from restrictions on environmentally sensitive
land is in many instances losses of government-created windfalls, thus
substantially minimizing any perceived fairness concerns that might exist.
C. Reciprocity
Closely related to givings is the notion of reciprocity, which is a third
reason that restrictions on land resulting in economic loss are not necessarily
unfair. Although the Supreme Court has never fully explained the concept, it
has long emphasized that a reason for not requiring compensation whenever
regulation decreases land value is that regulations will result in an "average
reciprocity of advantage."'" This has been emphasized in a long line of

79. The Supreme Court's decision in Dolan established that "rough proportionality"
must exist between the required exaction and adverse effects of development. Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391. This in effect limits exactions to the cost of development and not any value added to the
land. This is essentially the same as the rational nexus standard often applied by state courts.
See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (developers can
be required to pay only that portion of the costs that bears a rational nexus to their
development). For a discussion of the legal limitations on exactions, see Mark W. Cordes,
Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
513 (1995).
80. This example is drawn from Cordes, supra note 65, at 235-36.
81. For a general discussion of average reciprocity of advantage, see Raymond R.
Coletta, Reciprocity ofAdvantage and Regulatory Takings: Towarda New Theory of Takings
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Supreme Court decisions, dating back to Pennsylvania Coal and affirmed
recently in Lucas.82
The Court's concept of reciprocity is not entirely clear, but might be
viewed as having two aspects, what I have described elsewhere as specific and
general.8 3 Specific reciprocity concerns reciprocal benefits that flow to an
owner from the same regulation creating the burden in question. The absence
or presence of such specific reciprocity has at times been relevant in analyzing
whether a regulation constitutes a taking. 4
Just as importantly, reciprocity can also be seen from a broader
perspective which recognizes the reciprocal benefits of economic regulation
in general. The Supreme Court is arguably alluding to this general reciprocity
when it says that it is usually fair to assume that legislation is simply
"adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.., that secure an average
reciprocity of advantage' 5 to everyone concerned. Thus, although a
particular regulation might decrease the value of an owner's property, that
same owner benefits from numerous other regulations that restrict other

Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REv. 297 (1990). For an article critical of the modem application
of the "average reciprocity of advantage" test see Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the
"Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage " Rules in a Comprehensive Takings
Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1449, 1489-1522 (1997). Professor Oswald states that in its early
formulation the test served a useful purpose by comparing the burdens imposed on landowners
to the benefits that the same regulation might provide the same landowners. She states that the
Supreme Court has more recently "corrupted" the test by comparing the burden on the
landowner to the "benefits to society as a whole." Id. at 1489. She correctly concludes that
such a comparison of landowner burden and societal benefits misses the central point of the
takings clause, which is the fairness of making individuals bear burdens which should be borne
by society as a whole. See id. at 1520-22. However, as I suggest in the text, a distinction can
be drawn between specific and general reciprocity, both of which concern reciprocal benefits
to the affected landowner and thus relate to fairness concerns.
82. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922).
83. See Cordes, supra note 64, at 236-37.
84. See generally Colletta, supra note 8 1; Oswald, supra note 81.
85. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124) (citation
omitted).

Law Review

[3:681

parties. 86 These might include not only other environmentally based
regulations, but regulations that facilitate commerce more generally.
Any attempt to consider the fairness of restrictions on land use must
acknowledge the importance of these more general reciprocal benefits. To
ignore them provides only half the picture and distorts any accurate
accounting of regulatory impacts. In particular, it is unreasonable to make
government answerable for burdens imposed but not consider benefits created.
This is not to suggest that the idea of general reciprocity makes any land
use restriction, no matter what its impact, fair. Certainly some restrictions,
even on undeveloped land, might be unfair and even unconstitutional. Yet it
is important to realize that burdens in the form of economic loss are only one
part of a much bigger picture, one in which those burdened also receive
significant benefits. There is no guarantee that benefits and burdens will even
out in the long run, but certainly any concept of regulatory fairness must look
in both directions.
CONCLUSION
Private land ownership in America has always involved a balance
between private and public interests. Protection of private interests is
necessary to encourage investments to improve property, essential to meeting
critical needs such as housing, as well as providing for personal autonomy and
privacy. At the same time private property has also long been limited by
implied public interests. This social dimension of property is firmly
established in our legal and social culture, and has long been demonstrated in
judicial attitudes toward ownership of land. This balance has found
expression in takings jurisprudence, where private interests are weighed
heavily concerning the right to possession and interference with existing uses,
but the social dimension of property is weighed heavily when restricting
future uses.
Recent efforts to protect environmentally sensitive land are best viewed
in this light. Restrictions which limit development on such land are not
86. Professor Michelman makes this point in his seminal article on takings: Property,
Utility and Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationscfJust CompensationLaw, supra
note 5. He states that:
Efficiency-motivated collective measures will regularly inflict on countless people
disproportionate burdens which cannot practically be erased by compensation
settlements. In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that we
can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated
with collectively determined improvements will have been distributed "evenly"
enough so that everyone will be a net gainer.
Id. at 1225 (emphasis in original).
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depriving landowners of preexisting rights, but rather are simply enforcing the
inherent limitation that the property not be used to harm the public. Although
at times this might result in substantial diminution in land value, the
possibility of such loss must be part of the reasonable investment-backed
expectations when undeveloped land is involved. Moreover, any reduced land
value will often have been added by government in the first instance, plus
losses must be reviewed from the broader perspective of reciprocal benefits
and burdens that are part of economic life.
This is not to say that regulation of such property might not constitute a
taking under some circumstances. Where a restriction results in the loss of all
economic viability compensation is warranted, as well as in limited cases
under the Court's ad hoc balancing test. Even when not rising to the level of
a constitutional taking, governments might at times want to advance their
interests through a Purchase of Development Rights program or provide
Transferrable Development Rights to affected landowners, both of which are
designed to mitigate perceived unfairness. This might, in some instances,
present a more equitable adjustment of the balance between private and public
interests in the land.
However, it is important to recognize and affirm that private property
ownership in our legal system is not now, and has never been, absolute.
Rather, the ownership of private property necessarily involves an
accommodation of private and public interests. This accommodation must
necessarily evolve over time, with a continuing eye to protecting private
interests while addressing public concerns as societal conditions and values
change.

